The Dow Jones Industrial Average is a flawed index. The index uses price weights instead of conceptually superior market valuation weights, the companies included in the index are not chosen systematically and are not very representative of the U.S. market, and the index ignores returns from dividends. This paper shows that alternative stock price indices which use superior weighting methods and a more systematic inclusion criterion perform very similarly to the Dow Jones Industrial Average. However, ignoring dividends underestimates the long-run returns earned by stock market investors dramatically. If Dow Jones & Co. had included dividend returns in the DJIA when it was reformed in 1928, the index would be over 250,000 today.
Introduction
The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) is the most quoted stock market index in the world. The changes in the index are often perceived to be representative of the American stock market. This paper discusses whether the performance of the DJIA differs significantly from the performance of better-constructed indices and whether investors make a large mistake in paying attention to this flawed index. The DJIA has three major flaws. First, each company in the index is weighted by the price of its stock. The importance of each company in the index does not depend on the total market capitalization (a measure of the size) of the company. Instead, a highly priced stock has a higher weight than a lower priced stock. Each time a company in the DJIA splits the weight of this company decreases because the stock price falls by the ratio of the split. Second, the companies in the index are not representative of the market as a whole. The components of the DJIA are chosen more or less arbitrarily by the Dow
Jones & Co. to represent different industries, but they are not chosen according to fixed or well-defined rules. In particular, the DJIA is not an index of the 30 largest companies in the United States. A more representative index would include a much larger number of companies. Third, the DJIA is not a total return index because it excludes dividend distributions. 3 Dividends account for a considerable portion of returns to shareholders in the long run. If a stock index is used to gauge the return earned by market participants over long periods of time, a total return index would be far superior to a stock price index.
We find that the DJIA did not perform significantly different from alternative stock price indices over the period from 1928 until 1999. However, ignoring dividends results in a 2 See Pierce (1996) and Siegel (1998 Clarke and Statman (2000) discuss as well the fact that the Dow Jones Industrial Average does not include dividend payments. They show that the DJIA would have been at a level of 652,230 points at the considerable underestimation of the performance of stock markets over the long run. We summarize the different methods of constructing indices in Section 2. Section 3 reviews the long-run performance of the DJIA. In Sections 4 to 6 we discuss the effects of fixing the flaws of the DJIA. Section 4 shows how different weighting methods affect the performance of an index. Section 5 discusses the effects of the composition of the index and Section 6 shows that dividends account for a significant portion of the total returns of stocks and should not be ignored. Section 7 looks at the relative performance of the Nasdaq Composite Index and the DJIA over the 1973-99 period. Section 8 concludes the paper with a summary of our major findings.
Construction of Indices
The DJIA is a price-weighted index. The actual value of the index can be determined using the following formula:
The price of the stock of company i at time t is denoted by P i,t and the divisor is given by d t . The divisor of the DJIA originally equaled the number of companies in the average.
Since 1928, the divisor changes each time a member stock splits or pays a large stock dividend and each time the composition of the index is modified. These changes of the divisor ensure that these splits, stock dividends and membership changes do not cause a discontinuity in the value of the index. The divisor was 0.20145268 on December 31, end of 1998 if all the dividends since 1896 were included. They do not discuss the effect of the weights and the composition of the index.
1999. 
Different Weighting
The first major flaw of the DJIA is that the companies are not weighted according to their importance in the market. We evaluate the effect of the price weighting of the DJIA by computing alternative value weighted and equally weighted indices for the companies that were included in the DJIA. The composition of the Dow was taken from Dow Jones & Co. and the individual stock data were taken from the Center of Research on Security Prices (CRSP). CRSP only provides monthly data for most of the sample period.
Therefore it is not possible to change the composition of the alternative indices on the same date as the DJIA unless the composition changes happened to occur on the last day of the month. To mitigate any biases linked to the announcement of changes in the composition of the index, we assumed that all the composition changes occurred at the end of the month the adjustments occurred. We examine the period between October 1928 and December 1999. We used the 'holding period returns without dividends' from CRSP as the returns of the individual stocks. The 'price' and the 'number of shares outstanding' were used to determine the market capitalization of each company. We used the quotes from The Wall Street Journal if the corresponding data of CRSP were missing. Therefore, it puts far more weight on the smallest companies than does a value-weighted index and more weight on low priced stocks than a price weighted index.
Standard Oil changed to Exxon and then merged into Exxon-Mobil. Index was created in 1974 with 5,000 stocks and measures the performance of all U.S.
Different Composition
5 Banz (1981) found that small stocks systematically outperformed large stocks, even after adjusting for risk within the framework of capital asset pricing models.
6 Table A 
Dividend Payments
The third flaw of the DJIA is that it ignores dividend payments of the stocks. Dividend payments increase the total performance of stock portfolios considerably. This flaw is common to all of the other major stock indices -the S&P 500, the NYSE index, the Nasdaq, and the Wilshire 5000. Stock market indices are usually used to gauge the returns that stock market investors have earned over various time intervals. But, investors earn returns from both price appreciation and dividend payments. An index of stock prices only reflects one component of the total return enjoyed by investors. Stock prices naturally fall when stocks go ex-dividend. Most of the Dow stocks pay quarterly dividends. Therefore, there are more than 100 ex-dividend day events each year and with each event the DJIA systematically understates the return of investors in the Dow stocks.
The average dividend yield on the Dow stocks has varied from between 1.65 (1999) and 9.72 (1950) percent per year. 7 The average dividend yield over the whole period was 4.83 percent. Ignoring this return leads to enormous understatements of the long run payoff to owning stocks. It would not be difficult to publicize a total return index rather than a stock price index. On a daily basis, the difference would be barely noticeable.
However, over time horizons longer than three months, the difference becomes noticeable. Over decades, the difference becomes enormous. dividend payments. 8 See the Nasdaq-website for additional information (http://www.nasdaq.com). 9 The CRSP-Nasdaq index used here differs slightly from the 'official' Nasdaq Composite Index. The CRSP index was used because CRSP computes as well an index including dividends, whereas there is no
The DJIA includes larger, better-established companies that tend to pay higher dividends than the smaller and younger companies in the Nasdaq index. The average annual dividend yield of the DJIA between 1973 and 1999 amounted to 4.74 percent, whereas the Nasdaq Index yielded only 2.15 percent. Table 7 .1 summarizes the mean returns and the standard deviations of the two indices over the period from 1973-1999. The Nasdaq index has a much higher standard deviation than the DJIA. A statistical test of the equality of the mean of the returns of the two indices cannot be rejected for the indices with dividends at a 10 percent confidence level (the t-value is 1.0483) but it can be rejected for the indices without dividends (the t-value is 1.9362). We compute Sharpe ratios (1966) to compare the performance of a Nasdaq and a Dow portfolio using the summary statistics from Table 7 .1. The ratio measures the corresponding official Nasdaq Composite Index including dividends. There are many factors that cause the indices to differ. First are differences in the constitution between the two indices (CRSP exclude foreign and preferred stocks, rights, and warrants). Moreover, Nasdaq reweights their index on an intraday basis. Our interpretation of these results is that the superior performance of the Nasdaq over the DJIA for the period 1973-98 is greatly diminished once dividends are considered. In fact, taking account of the noticeably higher monthly standard deviation in the Nasdaq
Composite's total returns diminishes the over-performance of the Nasdaq index significantly. This simply emphasizes the point that stock price indices are very poor measures of the total return to investors over lengthy periods of time.
Conclusions
The Dow Jones Industrial Index was originally designed in the late nineteenth century.
Keeping the computational mechanics as simple as possible was essential. Therefore, the index was constructed using price weights. Computing it simply involved adding up the prices of the component stocks and dividing the result by a number, originally the number of stocks. This weighting system has little going for it now that computation is infinitely faster and cheaper. Nonetheless, we find that a value weighted DJIA would have performed very similarly to the actual Dow index. The price weighting scheme, while crude, has not by itself caused the index to be misleading.
Similarly, the inclusion of only thirty firms in the DJIA is difficult to justify today.
Perhaps in 1928 a case could have been made that there were only thirty stocks whose trading was sufficiently liquid to justify including them in a daily index. Clearly there are several thousand such companies today. The thirty stocks of the DJIA are chosen somewhat arbitrarily. We computed a price index of the thirty companies with the largest market capitalizations in the country. We also compared the Dow with the Standard and Poor's 500 and a total market index. While the December 1999 value of the DJIA trailed the value of the broader indices, the differences were not dramatic. In fact, we could not reject the hypothesis that the mean monthly return of the DJIA was the same as mean return for the other value-weighted indices. Again, the limited and somewhat arbitrary inclusion of firms in the DJIA does not seem to have caused it to be misleading.
The third and final flaw of the DJIA, shared with all other leading stock market indices, is serious and quantitatively important. As a stock price index, changes in the DJIA understate the returns earned by market participants. The failure to account for dividends means that the index is less and less useful over longer and longer time horizons. We found that a value weighted total return index of the Dow companies would be over 250,000 points today. We also found that most of the superior performance of the Nasdaq Composite over the DJIA in the 1973-99 period disappears once dividends are considered.
Our work suggests that publicizing a value weighted, broadly defined, total return index which includes dividend payments of stocks would be useful for gauging the returns offered by U.S. equity markets. Such an index could be continuously computed and might aid people in making their own portfolio decisions. 
